This paper attempts to borrow the tradition of estimating policy reaction functions in monetary policy literature and apply it to capital controls policy literature. Using a novel weekly dataset on capital controls policy actions in 21 emerging economies over the period 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2015, I examine the mercantilist and macroprudential motivations for capital control policies. I introduce a new proxy for mercantilist motivations: the weighted appreciation of an emerging-market currency against its top five trade competitors. There is clear evidence that past emerging-market policy systematically responds to both mercantilist and macroprudential motivations. The choice of instruments is also systematic: policy-makers respond to mercantilist concerns by using both instrumentsinflow tightening and outflow easing. They use only inflow tightening in response to macroprudential concerns. I also find that policy is acyclical to foreign debt but is countercyclical to domestic bank credit to the private non-financial sector. The adoption of This proxy measures the real appreciation of an EME's currency against its top five trade competitors.
Non-Technical Summary
Are capital controls macroprudential or mercantilist? This question is of great importance in the ongoing reshaping of the global financial architecture, but there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on how these tools have actually been used by emerging markets. The paper asks with which objectives -macroprudential or mercantilist -have policy-makers in emerging economies used capital controls. It takes a policy reaction function approach, clearly delineating the different motivations, and the trade-offs therein. The paper uses a detailed weekly dataset on capital controls policy that directly measures policy actions by 21 major emerging-market economies (EMEs) over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] . It also proposes a novel proxy for mercantilist concerns to disentangle them from macroprudential concerns.
This proxy measures the real appreciation of an EME's currency against its top five trade competitors.
The idea of asking how policy should or does react to competing objectives is not new in economics, although it is new in the capital controls literature. Monetary economics has a long tradition of estimating monetary policy rules (e.g., Taylor, 1993) . The premise is that well-designed policy rules can allow policy-makers to overcome time-inconsistency problems with monetary policy. In a similar vein, policy rules for capital controls could constrain the ability to expropriate past investments. This paper estimates a descriptive reaction function, without claiming that such reaction functions reflect optimal rules. Even without an assessment of optimality, this exercise is important as it contributes to improving the transparency of policy.
The results provide clear evidence that capital controls policy in emerging markets has been systematic, and that it has responded to both macroprudential and mercantilist motivations. The use of net inflow tightening measures can be described by a function of mercantilist and macroprudential motivations. The results also suggest that capital controls have not systematically been targeted to foreign or foreign currency debt. Rather, policy appears that inflow controls are countercyclical to domestic bank credit to the private nonfinancial sector. The tightening of controls on foreign credit when domestic credit is booming may simply reflect that regulators find it easier to target foreign credit rather than domestic credit, either because of lack of adequate domestic prudential tools or because of shortcomings of domestic institutional frameworks. As capital controls become more widely used as tools of macroprudential policies, future research and policy discussions could focus on how best to ensure that these instruments are directly targeted to the vulnerabilities they seek to address. Exploring the two motivations further, I find development in governance arrangements for macroprudential policies led to capital controls policies responding more to systemic risk concerns. I also find that mercantilism has a basis in higher exchange rate passthrough to export prices.
Introduction
Capital controls are restrictions on cross-border trade in assets. The recent global financial crisis has reignited the debate on the systematic use of capital controls to manage the domestic economic and financial cycles. A new policy paradigm has emerged, which views capital controls as having a preventive role in maintaining financial stability, i.e., as ex-ante tools to prevent buildup of systemic risk by limiting the growth of credit (BIS-FSB-IMF, 2011; G20, 2011; Ostry et al., 2011; Ostry et al., 2012) .
The new paradigm is backed by a growing theoretical literature that views capital controls as optimal ex-ante policies in the presence of pecuniary externalities in residents' borrowing decisions (Mendoza, 2002; Korinek, 2010; Korinek and Sandri, 2016; Bianchi, 2011; Uribe, 2007) . In this framework, residents face a collateral constraint that depends on the real exchange rate. Individual agents take the real exchange rate (and the value of the collateral) as given when taking their borrowing decisions, but in aggregate, the real exchange rate depends on the borrowing decisions of the individuals. This feedback loop leads to excessive foreign borrowing in good times, and increases the probability of a crisis. Ex-ante capital controls that limit real exchange rate appreciation in cyclical upturns also limit excessive borrowing, and are therefore viewed as macroprudential tools in this literature.
While much of the recent literature focuses on the macroprudential objective of capital controls policy, there is another potential objective of capital controls policy -the mercantilist objective.
1 The mercantilist objective is to promote exports by manipulating the terms of trade or preventing foreign control of strategic industries (Bernanke, 2015; Costinot et al., 2014; Heathcote and Perri, 2016; Dooley et al., 2014) . Proponents of this view argue that attempts to prevent the exchange rate from appreciating -either through capital controls or reserves accumulation -are in fact motivated by the objective of gaining trade advantage over export competitors. Further, they argue that imposition of capital controls by one emerging-market economy (EME) during upturns in the global financial cycle only deflects these flows to other emerging markets and can lead to a beggar-thy-neighbour currency war.
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Are capital controls macroprudential or mercantilist? This question is of great importance in the ongoing reshaping of the global financial architecture, but there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on how these tools have actually been used by emerging markets. A recent paper by Fernández et al. (2015b) finds that capital controls do not vary over 1 The term "new mercantilism" was used in the context of the reserves accumulation debate before the global financial crisis, in the paper by Dooley et al. (2003) , and has since been used to describe the strategy of managing the exchange rate through systematic calibration of capital controls on inflows as well. For empirical literature assessing mercantilist motive in reserves accumulation, see Aizenman and Lee (2007) , Ghosh et al. (2012) and references therein. For theoretical literature on the mercantilist motive in reserves accumulation, also see Durdu et al. (2009) .
the business cycle. On the mercantilism objective, there is only indirect evidence that certain types of inflow controls benefit the largest exporting firms (Alfaro et al., 2014) .
Most of the recent literature is framed in a way that suggests that macroprudential and mercantilist objectives would require the same directional policy response. That is, much of the debate assumes that the exchange rate cycle and the financial cycle in emerging economies is highly synchronized, and a policy of mitigating exchange rate changes would also mitigate the credit cycle. However, recent data suggest otherwise. Table 1 shows the correlations between real effective exchange rate (REER) and external credit gap for 19 emerging economies, for 2001Q1-2015Q4 and its various sub-periods. The recent models for macroprudential capital controls assume that this correlation is positive, i.e., REER appreciates when external credit it booming. However, the table shows that this correlation was positive only for eight economies for the period 2001Q1-2015Q4. For 13 countries, the correlation was positive in at least one sub-period, but for 6 countries, it was always negative. This table suggests that the two objectives of capital controls policy may involve trade-offs. When the exchange rate is appreciating but the credit-to-gross-domestic-product (GDP) gap is low, tighter capital inflow controls could further reduce credit availability in the domestic economy and curtail economic growth. On the other hand, looser inflow controls to boost domestic credit could lead to a further appreciation of the currency and hurt exporting and importcompeting sectors. How have policy-makers responded in such situations?
The paper asks: With which objectives -macroprudential or mercantilist -have policy-makers in emerging economies used capital controls? It takes a policy reaction function approach, clearly delineating the different motivations, and the trade-offs therein. There is some recent literature that has tried to predict capital controls policies (Fernández et al., 2015b; Fratzscher, 2014; Forbes et al., 2015; Aizenman and Pasricha, 2013) . However, these papers focus on specific variables to which policy responds, not on the motivation that these variables represent. For example, the aforementioned papers assess whether policy reacts to net capital inflows (NKI) and find that it does. But the motivation behind that NKI response could be macroprudential or mercantilist. This paper estimates a descriptive, empirical policy reaction function to explore how policy reacts to competing objectives.
The idea of asking how policy should or does react to competing objectives is not new in economics, although it is new in the capital controls literature. Monetary economics has a long tradition of estimating monetary policy rules (e.g., Taylor, 1993) . The premise is that well-designed policy rules can allow policy-makers to overcome time-inconsistency problems with monetary policy, gain credibility and therefore make policy more effective. Policy rules can also allow policy-makers to communicate policy more effectively, and enhance accountability of the monetary authority. In a similar vein, recent literature has explored the time-inconsistency of domestic macroprudential policy under commitment (Bianchi and Mendoza, 2016) . Moreover, if there is a trade-off between stabilizing the exchange rate and mitigating the external credit cycle, could macroprudential policymakers face political pressure towards forbearance? Note: Country abbreviations are ISO codes. Real effective exchange rate is the JP Morgan broad index, with 2010=100. Increases in REER imply appreciation of the currency. External credit gap is the deviation of external credit from its lagged 10-year moving average. External credit is the sum of stock of liabilities to BIS reporting banks (locational banking statistics) and the outstanding stock of international debt securities (from BIS International Debt Securities Database). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
The Taylor rule is prescriptive -it recommends how policy-makers should react. This paper, by contrast, estimates a descriptive reaction function, without claiming that such reaction functions reflect optimal rules. 4 Even without an assessment of optimality, this exercise is important as it contributes to improving the transparency of policy. Transparency around the use of capital controls policy can help attract capital inflows and prevent destabilizing outflows when the controls are used, by constraining the ability to expropriate past investments (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004) . 5 It can also strengthen the accountability of the macroprudential authority and assuage concerns about the spillovers of such policy.
A related contribution of the paper is that it introduces a novel proxy for mercantilist concerns, to disentangle them from macroprudential concerns. Both the nominal exchange rate against major currencies (US dollar or euro) and the real effective exchange rate suffer from the shortcoming that they could reflect both macroprudential and mercantilist motivations (as most EME agents are able to borrow only in hard currencies of countries which are also main export destinations and import suppliers for these EMEs). EMEs' use of capital controls to prevent REER appreciation or appreciation against the US dollar could reflect the desire to prevent an increase in collateral value (as envisaged in recent literature) or the desire to promote exports or protect import-competing industries. Therefore, I propose a novel proxy for mercantilist concerns that measures the real appreciation of an EME's currency against its top five trade competitors. As these competitors are emerging or developing countries, in whose currencies the EMEs do not borrow, the movements of the EME currencies against the currencies of these countries do not reflect macroprudential concerns, but capture only mercantilist concerns. I survey the recent theoretical literature to clearly define other testable hypotheses with respect to different motivations for using capital controls. This allows me to identify mutually exclusive sets of macro-financial variables to define macroprudential and mercantilist motivations.
A third contribution of the paper is that it uses a detailed weekly dataset on capital controls policy that directly measures policy actions by 21 major emerging market economies over the period 2001w1-2015w52. I extend the Pasricha et al. (2015) dataset for four years, 2011-2015, and use the announcement dates of the policy actions, rather than the effective dates used in Pasricha et al. (2015) . The use of data on policy actions also closely parallels the monetary literature on modeling central bank policy rate. Two recent papers that assess the motivations for inflow controls -Fratzscher (2014) and Fernández et al. (2015b) -use annual datasets that are better measures of cross-country variation in existence of capital controls on different types of transactions than of actual policy changes.
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Finally, this paper is the first to provide evidence that strengthening the institutional frameworks for macroprudential policy increases the weight of macroprudential motivations even in the use of capital controls policy in emerging markets. In recent years, a number of emerging markets have strengthened their governance frameworks by adopting explicit financial stability mandates by central banks or the creation of inter-agency financial stability 5 In Chapter 15, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) show that under discretion, the government has an incentive to tax all past investment at time 0 and then set the capital tax to zero for future dates.
6 Forbes et al. (2015) and Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) also use datasets on capital control policy actions. However, the Forbes study uses data only for the post-global financial crisis period, from 2009-2011, and the focus of the paper is on estimating effects of capital controls rather than on disentangling the different motivations for using capital controls. Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) focus on outflow controls only, and on whether the possible loss of fiscal revenue from repression constrained EMEs' use of outflow controls to manage the net capital inflow pressures.
councils (Table 2) . If these developments led to capital controls policies responding more to systemic risk concerns, even though capital controls are often not solely under the purview of a single authority, this strengthens the case for the recent international efforts to develop governance arrangements for macroprudential policies.
The paper has a number of new and interesting results on the use of capital controls in emerging markets. The results provide evidence that capital controls policy in emerging economies has been systematic, and that it has responded to both macroprudential and mercantilist motivations. The use of net inflow tightening measures can be described by a function of mercantilist and macroprudential motivations. Moreover, I find that the choice of instruments is systematic: policy-makers respond to mercantilist concerns by using both instruments -inflow tightening and outflow easing. However, they use only inflow tightening in response to macroprudential concerns. This is the first paper to provide evidence of the existence of a macroprudential motivation in the use of capital controls policy, even before these controls were generally acknowledged as valid tools of the macroprudential policy
toolkit. Yet, the results in this paper also underline that the concerns about a currency war are also justified -capital controls have also been systematically used to preserve competitive advantage in trade.
Further, I find that policy is not countercyclical to the specific macroprudential concerns related to external or foreign currency borrowing. Rather, policy appears acyclical to these variables, but is countercyclical to domestic bank credit to the private non-financial sector. This choice seems rational -EMEs prevent domestic residents from borrowing abroad by tightening inflow controls when domestic banks are lending at a brisk pace, but ease restrictions on foreign borrowing when the domestic bank credit-to-GDP gap is low (for example, if domestic banks are saddled with non-performing loans [NPLs] , as in the post-2012 world). The targeting of foreign credit when domestic credit is booming may reflect the possibility that regulators find it easier to target foreign credit rather than domestic credit, either because of a lack of adequate domestic prudential tools, or because of shortcomings in domestic institutional frameworks. For example, if domestic regulators can do little to stem excessive lending to politically preferred sectors in economies where state banks dominate domestic lending, they may prefer to change restrictions on foreign credit to manage total credit in the economy. Exploring the two motivations further, I find development in governance arrangements for macroprudential policies led to capital controls policies responding more to systemic risk concerns. I also find that mercantilism has basis in higher exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) to export prices. Higher ERPT to export prices means that exporters do not change the prices in their domestic currency much in response to appreciation of their currency. As a result, the customers of these countries face much of the cost of the currency appreciation, potentially making the exports of these countries more sensitive to appreciation. I find that countries with high export price ERPT react more strongly to mercantilist motivations, particularly when the exchange rate pressures against competitors are strong.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data on capital controls. Section 3 reviews the literature on the two motivations for capital controls, and describes the new the mercantilism proxy. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and the data on other macrofinancial variables. Section 5 describes the results and evaluation of the baseline models. Section 6 evaluates robustness of the main results. Section 7 concludes. There are three main differences between the data used in this paper and the Pasricha et al. (2015) dataset. First, in this paper, I use the announcement dates of the changes, rather than their effective dates. Second, I drop changes that were pre-announced by more than 60 days, as changes that have more than a 60-day implementation lag are likely to be more structural in nature, rather than imposed for macroeconomic and macroprudential management. Third, in this paper, I include changes that potentially affect both inflows and outflows (e.g., currencybased measures) on both the inflow and outflow sides. That is, these changes are counted twice.
In the baseline models, I use the weighted version of the dataset and exclude policy changes that affect FDI. In the weighted version of the Pasricha et al. (2015) Not all emerging markets were equally active in changing capital controls policies (Figure 2 ). In the baseline models, I use the 11 most active countries, i.e., those that had at least 32 policy actions in the 15-year period, with at least one inflow tightening. 
The motivations for capital inflow controls
The literature identifies two main motivations for using inflow side capital controls: mercantilist and macroprudential. In this section, I survey the theoretical and empirical literature on each of these motivations to identify the testable hypothesis and variables that would represent each of the motivations in the empirical analysis. I also introduce the new mercantilism proxy that I use to delineate macroprudential from mercantilist motivations.
Mercantilist motivation
Mercantilist motivation can be understood as the strategy to promote export-led development by keeping the exchange rate undervalued, through a combination of capital controls and reserves accumulation (Dooley et al., 2003 (Dooley et al., , 2014 . A large empirical literature has tested the macroeconomic versus prudential motivations for foreign exchange reserves accumulation, a policy complementary to capital controls (Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Choi and Taylor, 2017; Ghosh et al., 2012; Cheung and Qian, 2009; Jeanne and Ranciere, 2006) . In this literature, export growth rates and exchange rate undervaluation relative to fundamental purchasing power parity value are used as proxies of mercantilist motivation, with higher levels of reserves associated with greater undervaluation and greater export growth. These regression specifications focus on explaining cross-country differences in levels of reserves and do not assume causality. If the mercantilist strategy is successful, one would expect countries that ended up accumulating larger reserves hoardings to have seen higher export growth and undervalued exchange rates. Yet this does not directly translate into a policy strategy: should countries intervene more (through reserves accumulation or capital controls) when export growth is high or when it is lagging?
Another variable that could reflect mercantilist motivation is suggested by Costinot, Lorenzoni and Werning (2014) . In a two-country model, they find that from a mercantilist perspective, the optimal capital controls policy is countercyclical. In their model, a country growing faster than its trading partner has incentives to promote domestic savings by taxing capital inflows or subsidizing capital outflows, and vice versa. However, this model is a twocountry model, rather than a small open economy model, limiting its applicability to EMEs.
The literature therefore doesn't provide very clear guidance on identifying mercantilist motivation. The problem is further compounded when one is trying to delineate mercantilist from macroprudential motivation, as discussed below.
Macroprudential motivation
Macroprudential policy is defined by an objective -that of addressing systemic risks in the financial sector to ensure a stable provision of financial services to the real economy over time (BIS-FSB-IMF, 2011) . In other words, the objective is to mitigate booms and busts in the finance cycle. Under this policy framework, capital controls could be considered tools of macroprudential policy if they specifically targeted the source of systemic risks from external finance, particularly those that cannot be addressed using other (non-residency-based) prudential tools.
Assessing whether capital controls have been used as macroprudential tools would necessitate the assessment of systemic risk buildups around the time that capital controls were changed, and the assessment of whether these controls targeted the systemic risk. In the practitioner's guidebook, measures of systemic risk include, but are not limited to, credit-to-GDP gap, levels or growth of foreign credit -in particular, foreign currency or short-term credit -asset price booms, etc.
The policy discussions on capital controls as macroprudential tools have engendered a growing theoretical literature, which allows us to form testable empirical hypotheses (Bianchi, 2011; Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Benigno et al., 2011; Korinek, 2016; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2016) . In general, these models recommend a tax on stocks rather than on flows. As the probability that the collateral constraint will bind increases with the level of debt, some models recommend that the capital controls be set to positive values once net foreign liabilities have crossed a threshold (Bianchi, 2011; Korinek, 2011) . A testable hypothesis would then be that macroprudential inflow controls are tightened when the net foreign liabilities, particularly foreign currency debt liabilities, are above their country-specific historical average. Korinek (2016) finds that optimal capital controls are highest on dollar debt, followed by GDPlinked foreign currency debt, CPI-linked local currency debt, unindexed local currency debt and portfolio equity, in that order. Greenfield FDI is assumed not to create externalities, and therefore does not warrant restrictions or taxes.
Disentangling mercantilist and macroprudential motivations in exchange rate management While policy-makers and economic theorists broadly agree on most measures of systemic risk that capital controls could legitimately respond to, as part of macroprudential policy, there is one crucial variable where there is some disagreement. This variable is the exchange rate. The policy-makers' approach to macroprudential capital controls specifically recommends that macroprudential policy not be burdened with additional objectives -for example, exchange rate stability or stability of aggregate demand or the current account (BIS-FSB-IMF 2011) . Under this view of macroprudential capital controls, once the systemic risk variables are controlled for, the exchange rate changes (nominal or real) should not have additional explanatory power in an empirical specification.
In contrast, the recent theoretical literature on capital controls as macroprudential policy views the target of macroprudential policy more broadly, and encompasses targeting the REER. It views exchange rate appreciation as the channel that facilitates over-borrowing, especially foreign currency borrowing. The gist of these models is as follows: there is a pecuniary externality that agents do not take into account in their foreign borrowing decisions.
This externality arises because the value of the collateral depends on the real exchange rate, which the agents take as given. However, the value of the real exchange rate itself depends on the aggregate borrowing decisions of the agents. Greater aggregate borrowing leads to real exchange rate appreciation, which increases the value of the collateral and therefore encourages further external borrowing. During a financial crisis, the reverse feedback loop operates, leading to boom-bust cycles in capital flows and credit. This theoretical literature suggests that optimal capital controls are countercyclical, i.e., increasing in the level of net external debt, whenever there is a positive probability of a future crisis (and zero when the level of debt is low).
9 These models imply that simply finding that policy responds to exchange rate doesn't imply policy is mercantilist (or macroprudential). Note that in these models, the mercantilist motivation for capital controls is not explored. The only benefit of mitigating real exchange rate appreciation is mitigating external credit cycles. However, in practice, the mercantilist and macroprudential motivations may not be perfectly correlated. For example, net capital inflows (and exchange rate appreciation) may be high even when gross inflows are very low, because gross outflows are even lower. In this case, macroprudential motivation may not exist, as there is no excessive accumulation of foreign debt, while mercantilist motivation would exist.
To reconcile the policy and theoretical view, and as an additional tool to isolate the mercantilist motivation in exchange rate management, I propose a new proxy for mercantilist motivations. This proxy is the weighted exchange rate against the top five trade competitors.
When the exchange rate is appreciating against trade competitors, the EME can be interpreted indicates that the economies are competitors in the global market since both countries are net exporters of the same set of products. A negative value suggests that the economies do not specialize in the production or consumption of the same goods, and are therefore natural trading partners. 11 The specialization index removes bias of high export values because of significant re-export activities; thus it is more suitable to identify real producers than traders.
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For each EME in our sample, I identify five countries with the highest trade correlation index in each year. Next, I compute quarterly the real exchange rate appreciation of the EME's currency against each of the five trade competitors, and construct five different indices: two nominal indices, two real indices, and one country-specific index that uses the series that is most relevant for each country.
The two nominal proxies are defined as follows:
And the two real proxies are defined as:
where x it is the natural log of the nominal exchange rate against US Dollar for country i as of the end of week t (measured in USD per domestic currency unit), L is the lag operator and π it is the year-over-year change in consumer price index (CPI) as of week t, w j is the weight assigned to competitor j and is measure by the trade correlation index between country i and country j in week t (and is constant for all weeks in a calendar year). Note that the set of trade competitors (j) included in the calculation of the index may vary over time, but appears to be reasonably stable over five-year periods in the sample.
The nominal proxies measure the weighted nominal appreciation of a country's currency over the previous quarter (13 weeks, approximately) and over the previous year (52 10 The UNCTAD trade correlation index is available on an annual basis from 1995 to 2012. I use the 2012 competitor countries for 2013-2015. I look for trade competitors in a sample of 75 countries, to drop competitors that are too small. A list of trade competitors for each of the emerging markets in sample in 2012 is in Appendix Table A3 .
11 Note that this index doesn't take into account the extent to which each country competes with its competitors in third party markets. For example, if India and China export the same products, but to different countries, they are not necessarily competing with each other and the yuan exchange rate would not matter as much for India. A real exchange rate index that also takes this competition in third markets into account is computed in IDB (2016).
weeks, approximately), respectively. The real proxies are analogously interpreted. All proxies express the appreciation at annual rates.
Finally, I compute a country-specific proxy, which uses for each country and each capital control index the mercantilism index that is most important for that country, i.e., most highly correlated with capital control changes. I use this in the baseline models, and generally refer to this as the "Mercantilism Proxy," unless otherwise specified. That is, I compute the countryspecific correlation coefficient (over the full sample period) between the weighted and each of the four proxies defined above. Then that country's mercantilism proxy is the series with the highest correlation coefficient. I call this proxy , with the understanding that it uses a different series for each country for each capital control measure.
The reason for creating a country-specific proxy and not focusing only on the real appreciation indices is that for countries where food or commodities are a large share of the consumption basket as well as of imports, policy-makers may focus more on the nominal exchange rate rather than on the real exchange rate, as total inflation is too volatile and depends on the nominal exchange rate itself. where i=1 is the first policy action in the country sample (for example, net inflow tightening action), i=2 is the second policy action and i=N is the last policy action measure and there are K different discrete amounts by which the policy-makers may change controls. Also note that c 1 < c 2 < ⋯ < c K .
Let w i denote the vector of variables observed in the time period prior to the i th policy change that may have influenced the government's decision of how much to change policy.
The unobserved latent variable depends on w i according to * = ′ + where | ~ (0,1).
If Φ(z) denotes the probability that a logistic variable takes on a value less than or equal to z, then the probabilities that the target changes by s j can be written as follows:
An ordered logit model estimates the parameters β and c j through maximum likelihood methods. The conditional log likelihood function is
where Υ represents information observed through time t, i.e., Υ = ( , , −1 , −1 , … , 1 , 1 ) 13 The model description and notation in this section largely follows Hamilton and Jorda (2002). and (·) is the log of the probability of observing conditional on .
The baseline model then is a panel ordered logit model, of the form The greater the number of capital control actions, the more actively is the policy leaning against the cycle. The weighting scheme makes the number of policy actions per week almost a continuous variable, yet there is little difference in the strength of policy actions that are measured as, for example, 0.24 vs. 0.256. In the baseline models, to reduce the number of ordered categories, the weighted capital controls variable is sorted into five bins, as follows:
The baseline models estimate equation (5) for y it o . This transformation does not affect the main conclusions, as discussed in the robustness checks, but makes the estimations a bit faster. The models are estimated using random effects, but the results are robust to adding country-specific dummies.
Two sets of regressions
The results are reported in two stages. In the first stage, I use my preferred measures of mercantilist and macroprudential motivations, described in more detail in section 4.2 below.
Given the recent literature on global financial cycles and the concerns emerging-market policymakers have raised about the push factors in capital flows, I compare the baseline models with a VIX-only model (with no domestic variables). I also compare the baseline models with models that include only (country-specific) mercantilism proxy and the model that includes only the preferred macroprudential proxy (as well as other domestic policies). I compare these models using the area under the receiver operating characteristic (AUROC) curves and other model comparison criteria, described in section 4.3 below.
In 14 Basel III recommends using the broadest measure of credit possible. BIS makes available data on total credit gap, which includes credit from external sector. However, the time series on this variable starts late in the sample (after 2005 or even 2008) for many EMEs. Therefore, I use the narrower measure in the baseline models.
As a robustness check, I also control for other domestic macroprudential policies, creating a variable that is the total number of domestic macroprudential measures taken (summing up the components from Cerutti et al. (2016) , excluding the foreign currency reserves requirement measures, as the latter are already included in the capital controls data).
A note on the frequency of the variables is in order. Exchange rates (and other financial variables used in the second stage) are available at a weekly frequency. However, many of the macro variables are available at a quarterly or lower frequency. These are interpolated to weekly frequency using linear interpolation. An alternative would have been to use the last available value, but that could mean using observations that are no longer relevant for policy decisions. Further, policymaking is a forward-looking activity. The literature on assessing motivations for changes in monetary policy suggests that the results using only lagged variables to explain policy may be biased if policy-makers anticipate future evolution of variables and act on that information: policy-makers may not only change capital controls in response to past changes in economic variables, but also respond to their expectations of future evolution of these (Ramey, 2016) . The literature on Taylor Rules addresses this by using To capture mercantilist motivation, in the extended models, I use measures of relative GDP growth (real GDP growth in the EME less world real GDP growth), growth in index of industrial production for the manufacturing sector (actual and relative to other EMEs) and export growth. Summary statistics of all variables are provided in Appendix Table A .2.
Model evaluation
I evaluate the models using two standard criteria for assessing predictive ability of the model: the rank probability scores and the area under receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC).
The rank probability score (RPS) is a generalization of the Brier's quadratic probability score (QPS) for ordered outcomes. The Brier score summarizes the accuracy of binary forecasts. For ordered outcomes with multiple events, the rank probability score assesses how far the probability forecasts are from the observed events. That is, even when the forecast doesn't predict the accurate event, the RPS gives credit to models that were closer to the actual event. Let K be the number of forecast categories to be considered (five in this paper).
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For a given probabilistic forecast-observation pair, the ranked probability score is defined as The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve evaluates the binary classification ability of a model, and has recently been used in early warning literature . Let y * be the linear prediction of the latent variable from a binary logit model (i.e., one with a 0/1 dependent variable). Let predicted outcome be 1 whenever y * crosses a threshold c. That is, the predicted outcome = I(y * − c > 0), where I(.) is the indicator function.
Then, for a given c, one can compute the true positive rate TP(c) (i.e., the percentage of "1" observations that are correctly predicted to be "1") and the false positive rate, FP(c) (i.e., the percentage of 0 observations that are incorrectly predicted to be 1). The ROC plots the true 16 The description of RPS in this section follows Weigel et al. (2007) . 
Empirical results
The results indicate that emerging markets respond equally to mercantilist and macroprudential motivations when changing capital controls policies. Inflow controls policy is systematic, well captured by two variables: appreciation against trade competitors and domestic credit gap. However, inflow policy doesn't respond to the specific macroprudential concerns highlighted by recent theoretical literature: inflow policy is countercyclical to domestic bank credit to private non-financial sector, but is acyclical or procyclical to various measures of foreign credit. The reason for this is that foreign currency debt and external credit appear to be substituting for domestic bank credit, so that policy encourages foreign borrowing when domestic bank lending slows.
EMEs use both inflow tightening and outflow easing to respond to mercantilist concerns. The capital controls policy response is stronger in countries with high exchange rate pass-through to export prices, i.e., those whose exports stand to suffer more because of currency appreciation. Macroprudential motivations in capital controls policies became stronger after countries improved their institutional arrangements for macroprudential governance. Table 3 presents the results of the baseline model explaining (weighted, non-FDI) net inflow tightening. The reported coefficients are proportional odds ratios. A one-standarddeviation increase in the country-specific mercantilism proxy, other things being equal, increases the odds of taking a strong net inflow tightening measure by 33%, compared with the alternatives (taking a small net inflow tightening measure, doing nothing or net easing of inflow controls). The results with other mercantilism proxies are similar -a one-standarddeviation nominal appreciation against trade competitors over the previous 13 weeks increases the odds of taking a net inflow tightening measure by 27%, compared with the alternatives. The estimated coefficients for mercantilism proxies are all significant at 1% level of significance.
Baseline results: mercantilist and macroprudential motivations in use of inflow tightening policies
On the macroprudential side, a one-standard-deviation increase in bank credit to GDP gap has a similar effect. It increases the odds of a net inflow tightening by about 30%
relative to the odds of the alternatives, other things being equal. The estimated coefficients for the bank-credit-to-GDP gap are also significant at 5% or 1% levels in all specifications.
The final row in Table 3 presents the results with the nominal exchange rate against the US dollar as a measure of mercantilist motivations. The US Dollar plays an outsize role in trade invoicing and is often the focus of EME policy-makers' currency stabilization efforts. 17 US Dollar appreciation has a stronger impact on the likelihood of policy action than any of the mercantilist proxies, even after controlling for macroprudential motivations. This suggests that there is some part of variation in the exchange rate against USD that is not captured either by the mercantilist or macroprudential proxies and may reflect a mix of the two factors, or some other factors, for example, macroeconomic management.
Like monetary policy, capital controls policy changes also come in cycles -a net inflow tightening increases the probability that the next action will be a net tightening as well -and the odds ratio increases by about 30%. Net tightening of capital controls also comes with improvements in general government structural balances. Monetary policy stance and VIX are not significantly correlated, associated with the probability of net inflow tightening measures, but inflow tightening measures are significantly less likely to be used during crisis periods. The last column of Table 3 shows the model with mercantilism proxies replaced by nominal 13-week appreciation against the US dollar. It suggests that the US Dollar rate plays a special role in EME policymaking, which is not fully captured by macroprudential or mercantilist motivations.
17 Casas et al. (2016) document how a majority of global trade is invoiced in USD. Shambaugh (2004) documents that 139 out of 177 countries studied had the US Dollar as their base currency. As the capital controls index is based on qualitative information, one may ask how the interpretation of results is affected if the intensity of the changes is not perfectly captured. The dataset on capital controls captures the intensity of changes in two ways: (1) the capital controls data identifies the changes at a granular level -policy announcements are not the same as policy actions. A policy action is identified by splitting announcements along six dimensions, meaning that if policy-makers were making bigger, "more intense"
announcements in certain periods, e.g., during crisis periods, this should result in more counted actions in these periods. This is in fact the case with the index, as seen in Figure 7 above. Second, the index weights the actions by the share of the IIP category that the action affects, thus giving more weight to actions that affect a larger share of the country's balance sheet. However, to the extent that the data don't capture intensity perfectly, we may underestimate the size of the responses (if policy-makers systematically tightened more intensely than they eased, and we don't have that information). Therefore, we may interpret the results as capturing the minimum policy reaction. In this context, the finding that capital controls policy did react to mercantilist and macroprudential motivations gains even more significance, as the true coefficients may be even larger.
Our interest is not only in the statistical significance of coefficients of interest, but in the ability of the baseline model to predict policy. For this, one needs to evaluate the predictions of the model and compare them with those of alternative (perhaps simpler) models. One may ask, for example, how good the model is compared with a model with only mercantilist or only macroprudential motivations. Recent literature has highlighted the role of global factors in determining emerging market capital flows -in particular, VIX. Therefore, in Table 4 , I evaluate the baseline model (with the country-specific mercantilism proxy) against these alternative models, using the RPS as well as the pseudo-log likelihood. The table shows that the baseline model performs better than all the others -with improvements in log likelihood, as well as rank probability score. While the aggregate statistics are useful summaries of model performance, they average over predictions of no change as well as change. As there are a large number of weeks when policy did not change (the broad majority of observations), these summary statistics may not fully reflect the improvements in predicting policy actions across models. Therefore, it is instructive to look at the actual versus predicted values from the different models. Figure 4 plots the actual policy actions versus the predicted values of the latent variable from the baseline and VIX-only models defined as in Table 4 , for four major economies: India, China, Brazil and Turkey. The figure shows that the latent variables co-move remarkably well with actual inflow policy actions. The VIX-only model, whose predictions will be the same for all countries, except the dip in the country-specific crisis periods, does not explain the level of direction of policy well.
Figure 4: Predicted latent variable has a high degree of co-movement with actual net inflow tightening actions
As a further assessment of the models, I compute the ROC curves and test whether the AUROC is significantly different across models. Table 5 computes the AUROC for the different models and tests their significance. The AUROC for the baseline model varies between 0.69 and 0.71 for predicting policy actions (i.e., excluding models predicting ordered (weighted, non-FDI) net inflow tightening=0) with standard errors of about 0.03. This is better than a coin toss, though lower than a perfect predictor, which would have an AUROC of 1.
However, these AUROCs are similar to those achieved in the recent models for crisis prediction, e.g., the baseline models in Schularick and Taylor (2012) . This suggests that the baseline model does reasonably well as a predictor of capital controls policy. Notes: Each model is panel logit, with the dependent variable redefined to be a dichotomous variable. For example, in the first block of models, the dependent variable takes value 1 when the ordered (weighted, non-FDI) net inflow tightening variable =-1, and 0 otherwise. The final model has fewer observations because for at least one country in the sample, the model with the crisis dummy perfectly predicts action. These observations are dropped. To summarize, the results so far suggest that both mercantilist and macroprudential motivations are important in predicting the use of inflow tightening measures. Moreover, the strongest inflow tightening actions respond more to mercantilist than to macroprudential concerns.
Can additional proxies for mercantilist or macroprudential motivations improve the model fit?
So far, the analysis has focused on a relatively simple model, with one proxy each of mercantilist and macroprudential motivations. That leads to the question of whether one can do better by adding proxies for each of the motivations. As discussed in section 3, recent literature specific to capital controls has recommended that capital controls be targeted to foreign borrowing, specifically foreign currency borrowing. Therefore, I tested a number of additional proxies for macroprudential motivations, sequentially adding them to the baseline model. The results are in Table 6 below. To ensure consistency across models, all the models in Table 6 are run on the same observations as the smallest available data series -in this case, equity prices -so the baseline model in this table is not the same as in Table 3 . An interesting result in the table is that many of the measures of external vulnerability -for example, external credit and the stock of foreign currency debt securities -are negatively associated with the probability of tightening inflow controls. A closer look at the data on domestic and external credit suggests an explanation: rather than use countercyclical capital controls to manage external vulnerabilities, as suggested by the recent literature, EMEs are using capital controls to manage the total flow of credit in the economy. The correlation between bank credit gap and external credit/GDP in the sample is negative and significant (-0.2 for the 21 countries in sample, -0.12 for the 11 active countries). In Table 7 , I report the results for adding variables for mercantilist motivation. As there are only a few additional variables, I report the full regression results rather than just the summary. The additional variables, relative GDP growth or growth in manufacturing sector IIP, or export growth (value or volume) are also not significant and do not improve the baseline specification. Notes: Reported values are proportional odds ratios. Sample period is 2001w1-2015q52. All domestic control variables are one-week lagged. All continuous domestic variables are standardized but centred at 0, i.e., the variables are divided by their standard deviation but not demeaned. Monetary policy stance and fiscal policy stance are variables that take the value +1 if monetary policy is tightened in the previous week (or structural balance improves), -1 for expansionary policies and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors used. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Predicting net NKI restricting actions
The analysis so far has examined the motivations for changing controls on capital
inflows. Yet, countries have another tool to resist exchange rate appreciations: the easing of outflow restrictions (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2013) . In this section, I analyze the motivations for changing Net NKI restricting actions, defined as the sum of net inflow tightening actions and net outflow easing actions per week. These actions respond systematically only to mercantilist concerns (Table 8 and Figure 7) . The size and significance of the estimated proportional odds ratios for mercantilism proxies is similar to those in Table 3 for net inflow tightening actions.
Increases in the credit-to-GDP gap increase the odds of a strong net NKI restricting action over the odds of the alternatives, but the coefficient is not significant at the average values of other variables.
The results of Table 8 and Table 3 together imply that countries use both inflow tightening and outflow easing actions to respond systematically to mercantilist concerns, but use only inflow tightening actions to respond to macroprudential concerns. This is further evidence that policy is carefully calibrated: outflow easings do not directly reduce systemic risk, but can mitigate exchange rate pressures. Number of Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13
Pseudo-Log Likelihood -1927 -1932 -1933 -1932 -1933 -1902 Chi explore two such factors: the degree of sensitivity of a country's export prices to exchange rate changes, and the domestic governance frameworks for macroprudential policies. Specifically, I
ask two questions: First, do countries with high export price exchange rate pass-though (ERPT) respond more to mercantilist motivations? Second, has the development of governance arrangements for macroprudential policies led to capital controls being used in a more macroprudential fashion?
High ERPT to export prices means that the exporter's trading partners bear more of the cost of the exporting country's currency appreciation. This means that the countries' exports are potentially more sensitive to that appreciation, and policy-makers may in turn respond more to stem such appreciation. I use a dummy variable, which equals 1 for countries with greater than median export price ERPT and baseline specification for net NKI restricting actions (Table 8, Table 9 below. The interaction term is significant and suggests that at the average value of all variables, higher ERPT countries are more responsive to appreciation of the currency against trade competitors. As the model is non-linear, the size and significance of the interaction term depends on the values of the other variables. Therefore, to illustrate the effect of high ERPT, in Figure 8 , I compute the predicted probability of taking no net NKI restricting action, for different values of mercantilism proxy, for high and low ERPT countries.
The figure shows that for a wide range of values of country-specific mercantilism proxy, countries with high ERPT to export prices respond more strongly to competitiveness changes against trade competitors than low ERPT countries do.
To explore the issue of whether improvement in governance arrangements increases the weight on macroprudential motivations, I interact the bank credit gap variable with a dummy that equals 1 after the date on which each country enhanced its governance arrangements for macroprudential policies. These dates are listed in Table A .1 in the Appendix.
The results of the regressions are in Table 10 below. Net inflow tightening actions were countercyclical to bank credit gap in the period before the enhancement of governance arrangements for macroprudential policies, but after the introduction of governance arrangements became even more countercyclical. This can be seen in Figure 9 , which plots the predicted probabilities of taking no action, at different values of bank credit gap (with other variables held at their mean values), for the regression specification in Table 10 , equation 1.
These results give a positive message: that development of governance frameworks can enhance the macroprudential use of capital controls. But they also caution that in countries that stand to lose more from exchange rate appreciation, it may never be possible to have capital controls used only in a macroprudential manner. -1922 -1928 -1929 -1928 -1931 Chi 
Robustness checks
The results presented above are robust to a number of alterations in specifications.
First, I use alternative measures of capital controls policy (Table 11) . I run the baseline specifications without reducing the number of ordered categories. This leads to estimation of a large number of cut-offs for the latent variable, but doesn't affect the sign or significance (or the approximate size) of the estimated coefficients. The results presented in section 5 are also robust to using unweighted policy actions. Estimating reaction functions on all changes, including those affecting FDI, leads to a small decline in the estimated coefficient on bank credit gap in the baseline regression explaining net inflow tightening actions, but the coefficient is still significant. The other results are robust to including FDI-related changes.
Second, I include all countries in sample, not only the active ones. This reduces the estimated size of both coefficients (on mercantilist and macroprudential motivations), but the effects are still significant (Table 11 , column 4).
Third, I control for other domestic variables, including reserves accumulation, domestic macroprudential policy actions from Cerutti et al. (2016) and CPI inflation (Table 12 ).
The baseline results are robust to adding these variables. I also replace the monetary and fiscal policy stance variables with actual policy changes. Predicted probability of Net Inflow Tightening =0 13). I also add several key variables in the same specification. These modifications do not change the baseline results.
Finally, I report the goodness of fit test of out-of-sample forecasts (Table 14) . I use the last three years of the sample (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) as the out-of-sample period. Table 14 tests the significance of AUROC differences between the out-of-sample forecasts of the same four models as in Table 5 , i.e., Baseline, VIX-only, FX-only and MP-only models. The out-of-sample forecast performance of the models is a bit worse than the in-sample forecast performance, but the relative performance of the different models is in line with their relative in-sample performance. 
Conclusions
Are capital controls macroprudential or mercantilist? The results in this paper strongly suggest that they are both. The results provide clear evidence that capital controls policy in emerging markets has been systematic, and that it has responded to both macroprudential and mercantilist motivations. The use of net inflow tightening measures can be described by a function of mercantilist and macroprudential motivations. Moreover, the choice of instruments is also systematic: policy-makers respond to mercantilist concerns by using both instruments -inflow tightening and outflow easing. However, they use only inflow tightening in response to macroprudential concerns. This is the first paper to provide evidence of the existence of a macroprudential motivation in the use of capital controls policy, even before these controls were generally acknowledged as valid tools of the macroprudential policy toolkit. Yet, the analysis in this paper also underlines that the concerns of those who worry about a currency war are also justified -capital controls have also been systematically used to preserve competitive advantage in trade.
These results highlight an assignment problem of using one tool (inflow controls) to meet multiple objectives (Tinbergen, 1962) . They suggest a need for further debate on whether it would be globally optimal if countries used capital control actions solely as a tool of macroprudential policies, and if so, how to ensure that this is the case. The results also provide a potential answer to this second question -stronger governance frameworks for macroprudential policy. The evidence presented suggests that governance arrangements matter. Better understanding of policy objectives and tools, at the national and international levels, and better governance arrangements lead to more predictable policy. One caveat to the interpretation of the results is that much of the evidence on governance arrangements comes from the post-crisis period of ample global liquidity and it is difficult to disentangle the two effects.
The results also suggest that capital controls have not been targeted specifically to foreign-to-foreign currency debt. I find that inflow controls are not countercyclical to the specific macroprudential concerns related to external or foreign currency borrowing. Rather, policy appears acyclical to these variables, but is countercyclical to domestic bank credit to the private non-financial sector. The tightening of controls on foreign credit when domestic credit is booming may simply reflect that regulators find it easier to target foreign credit than domestic credit, either because of lack of adequate domestic prudential tools or because of shortcomings of domestic institutional frameworks. As capital controls become more widely used as tools of macroprudential policies, future research and policy discussions could focus on how best to ensure that these instruments are targeted directly to the vulnerabilities they seek to address. 
